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  In the modern world there are some political theorists – for example, so-called 
“rational-choice theorists” – who make only the slightest use of historical analysis in their 
normative political discourse. But there are other theorists whose work depends in 
concrete ways on historical research. One influential group of modern political thinkers, 
for example, advocates of what is variously called civic humanism or republicanism, 
advance their claims not merely through force of argument, but also through 
interpretations of historical sources and texts. Modern republican theorists claim that their 
movement is inspired by, or a revival and continuation of, a tradition of thought going 
back to antiquity, a tradition labelled “classical republicanism.” The claim is not a trivial 
one, since modern republicanism has sometimes presented itself as a “third way,” 
contrasting itself with the more utopian claims of socialism, oriented towards an ideal 
future, and liberalism, which treats the individual in abstraction from the history and 
traditions of his community.2 Modern republicans see themselves as realists grounded in 
history, reviving a set of beliefs and practices that are possible precisely because they are 
known to have been believed and practiced in the past. Philip Pettit lays out a project to 2
free citizens from various forms of dependence and arbitrary power, enlarging the scope 
of self-government and equalizing power-relations in society. He and his close ally, the 
historian Quentin Skinner, have made explicit claims that classical republican theory 
provides valuable resources that can inform the prudence of modern republicans and 
designers of public policy. They have made the even stronger claim that their notion of 
political liberty as “non-domination” is a distinct conception of liberty that can be found 
in the thought and practice of premodern republics, and that it should challenge and 
complicate the distinction between positive and negative liberty widely employed by 
modern political philosophers since Isaiah Berlin’s classic essay of 1958.3 
The “non-domination” concept of political liberty draws attention to a type of 
liberty not covered by Berlin’s dichotomy, a freedom that is enjoyed by persons who are 
not subject to other persons or groups that have “the capacity to interfere in their affairs 
on an arbitrary basis.”4 This type of freedom is neither freedom from interference with 
one’s choices (negative liberty), nor self-mastery or self-governance (positive liberty). It 
does not look to rights guaranteed by the state to protect certain zones of autonomy, but 
aims to enlarge the scope of free activity by shaping laws, institutions and customary 
norms in such a way as to equalize power in society and reduce arbitrary forms of 
dominance, whether economic or political.5 Furthermore, for republican freedom to be 
compromised, it is enough for the mere possibility of being dominated by an arbitrary 
power to exist in a polity. An absolute king, even one who is virtuous and just, takes away 
his subjects’ freedom (and therefore their happiness) by the very fact that he is absolute. 
Pettit, following Skinner, holds that this “non-domination” concept of liberty, before 3
liberalism, was the chief way in which liberty was understood and practiced in the 
classical republican tradition from the Roman republic to the British Commonwealth of 
the seventeenth century.6
The historical claims of modern civic republicans have not gone without their 
critics – most notoriously, the scorched-earth approach of David Wootton. Wootton has 
claimed, in effect, that the notion of a republican tradition is factitious in the logical 
sense, i.e. that the words “republic” and “republicanism” have been used to describe 
historical phenomena so diverse that they can have no common essence.7 Other 
methodological criticisms have been advanced as well: for example, Dario Castiglione’s 
warning that searching for the ancestry of modern ideas inevitably results in a kind of 
tunnel vision. He observes that modern republican theorists, in search of a usable past, 
have a tendency to reify eclectic and ad hoc arguments into a unified “republican 
tradition,” and suggests that we should rather speak of several distinct republicanisms.8 
The goal of the present paper is different. Its purpose is to investigate the historical 
claims of modern civic republicans more concretely, by examining the writings of 
political thinkers of the Italian Renaissance. The aim will be simply to find out whether 
the characterization of premodern republican thought by modern republican theorists is 
accurate.  I shall be concentrating primarily on the question of whether Italian Renaisance 
humanists have a conception of liberty as non-domination, and whether there is evidence 
for the related claims that premodern republican theorists regarded virtue and the active 
life as instrumental to acquiring this form of liberty.9  I shall also question whether 4
Renaissance ideas of liberty can be as easily separated from notions of hierarchy and 
elitism as modern republican theorists seem to assume. 
  One other point needs to be made by way of introduction. That relates to the 
position of Machiavelli with respect to Renaissance political thought. His brand of 
political prudence is, to be sure, highly characteristic of one tendency within a broader 
Renaissance culture, but he is by no means a typical Renaissance political thinker. In fact 
the most important political thinkers of the Renaissance are Aristotle and Cicero, or more 
accurately, Aristotle and Cicero as they were understood by the Renaissance. Renaissance 
humanists before Machiavelli who composed formal works on political topics, such as 
Coluccio Salutati, Pier Paolo Vergerio, Leonardo Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, Matteo 
Palmieri, Bartolomeo Platina, Francesco Patrizi and Aurelio Lippo Brandolini all 
operated within a broad Christian Aristotelian framework and used humanist versions of 
Aristotelian and Ciceronian political terminology. Machiavelli, while dealing with the 
same set of problems, consciously challenged, rejected and overturned the whole 
approach to politics developed by his humanist predecessors, particularly their highly 
conventional ideas about virtue and justice. In substantive terms he had much more 
sympathy with popular government than any of his forebears, and he was far more 
critical of Christianity than any writer of his time. Thus for most of the sixteenth century 
Machiavelli’s political writings were less influential than those of Aristotle and Cicero. 
The greatest of the humanist writers on politics, the Sienese writer Francesco Patrizi, 
though unknown today, was far more popular than Machiavelli for most of the century. 
Patrizi’s works on republican and princely government were printed 37 times, translated 5
into all the major European languages and reduced to epitomes for classroom use.10 
Patrizi was uncontroversial, the voice of conventional humanist wisdom, the darling of 
schoolmasters throughout Europe. Machiavelli’s floruit as an author, judged in terms of 
the number of editions of his works, did not come till the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century. Even then the spread of his ideas about statecraft was viewed with alarm in many 
quarters, even with paranoia, and he was the subject of virulent attacks well into the 
seventeenth century.11 Machiavellian was an adjective of vituperation, rather than praise. 
  Clarifying the place of Machiavelli in Renaissance political theory is necessary, as 
modern theorists of the non-domination model of liberty build their edifices  to a 
surprising extent on the single example of Machiavelli.12  Machiavelli of course is the 
only Renaissance political theorist who belongs to the modern canon of political works 
read in universities, so it is natural that he should be emphasized. Nevertheless, it needs 
to be recognized that in most respects he was an outlier from the mainstream of humanist 
writings on politics—mostly written in Latin—beginning with Petrarch and Salutati and 
continuing at least to Lipsius. Despite the use of Machiavelli by later writers like 
Harrington it is misleading to think of him as typical, or even paradigmatic, of the 
Renaissance humanist tradition of political reflection.13 He is to the Renaissance what 
Ptolemy of Lucca is to the scholastics: someone who shares sources and language with 
his contemporaries but whose methods, conclusions and wider moral outlook differ 
sharply from theirs. Machiavelli was the most original political writer of the Renaissance.  
For that reason if for none other he was sui generis.6
  How was political freedom understood by most humanist writers of the 
Renaissance who were sympathetic to non-monarchical government? The writings of 
Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and their followers prepare us to find therein some version 
of the non-domination model, for example, the idea that one must engage in the active 
life of the citizen in order to prevent becoming the victim of arbitrary power and of 
exploitation by the powerful; that law and institutions should be designed to prevent 
domination of society by the powerful and to help the weak secure their negative liberty. 
On this view the actions of the powerful need to be placed on view in the public forum, 
discussed and contested by the people. This was clearly a lesson that Machiavelli took 
from Roman history and one certainly finds echoes of it, in debased forms, in actual 
republican practice during the Renaissance. One of Lorenzo de’Medici’s famous sayings, 
was “it is ill living for the rich in Florence unless they rule,” meaning they need to be 
active politically to avoid being shaken down by the popolo or by hostile clientage 
groups. Less famous voices spoke of “play-to-pay” situations, where your interests and 
those of your clients needed to be represented in the public palace in order to prevent 
rivals from monopolizing public contracts or imposing unfair tax burdens. As they say in 
the American Congress, if you’re not at the table you’re on the menu. All this is 
consistent with a non-domination model of liberty (even if the examples cited suggest it 
was a model practiced by dominators as well as the dominated).
  However, we are not interested here in republican practice so much as in the ways 
formal humanist texts discuss the question of republican liberty. The issue most 
commonly arises in the context of a courtly debating theme about the relative merits of 7
republics and monarchies. The best-known example is probably that found in Book IV of 
Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier. Here Castiglione was merely summarizing the 
discussions in Francesco Patrizi’s Latin treatises on republic and princely education, a 
staple for his humanist readers. Patrizi and other fifteenth century authors like Aurelio 
Lippo Brandolini raised the question whether all power should be concentrated in the 
hands of a single individual, suitably restrained by law, or whether it is possible to justify 
a power-sharing arrangement such as that found in Renaissance oligarchies.14  By far the 
commonest argument in favor of this was the one that might be called the argument from 
the distribution of virtue. In Patrizi’s treatise on republican education, he argued that there 
are cases where Aristotle’s requirement for monarchy – that there be a single individual 
or family of outstanding virtue – is not met; one can find, says Patrizi, cases where a state 
has many virtuous individuals but no one of outstanding virtue. In these cases it would be 
unjust to place any one individual ahead of the rest.15 
  The assumption here (as elsewhere) is that virtue, understood as self-mastery, is a 
title to rule. This view was standard among humanists, whether republican or signorial. 
Virtue in humanist writings is not, as moderns republicans believe, merely a prophylactic 
against dominance by others. Behind Patrizi’s position is the logic of rationalistic ethics, 
the most important ethical model inherited from classical philosophy. The virtues are 
defined as a set of habits or behavioral patterns that solidify the control of reason over the 
passions and appetites. As applied to the larger theater of the state, the rule of virtue 
requires identifying a wise and virtuous prince or an aristocracy to rule the passionate and 
appetitive parts of society. Behind this lay the classical assumption that nature arrays 8
mankind into natural pyramids of moral ability, with a few wise and virtuous individuals 
at the narrow top and the passionate and vicious many on the broad bottom.  Moral 
excellence is something few can achieve.  It is by nature a scarce good unequally 
distributed. Indeed, it is only because of its scarcity that it can be used as a claim to rule. 
If all were equally virtuous, or equally capable of virtue, the argument that the virtuous 
should rule would be trivial or useless.  The argument, then, presupposes a meritocratic 
rather than an egalitarian outlook. Furthermore, in a good society the wise and virtuous 
rule, but for some Renaissance humanists this licensed a situation similar to some modern 
Marxian and socialist models, where enlightened rulers permit themselves to coerce 
ignorant subject populations in what is allegedly their own interest. For example, in most 
Renaissance republics the idea of differential virtue and prudence underwrote a graduated 
citizenship and a graduated deliberative process.16 Ideally, the wise and virtuous should 
formulate policy, whilst the many should only have the right to a yea-or-nay vote on 
policies formulated by their betters.
Indeed, the wider assumptions that lay behind these historical arguments for 
republican government would seem to be incompatible with a non-domination model of 
liberty. For the Italian humanists, whatever guarantees of legal equality a republic might 
grant individual citizens, there is no entitlement to self-rule independent of merit.  Those 
inferior in virtue are properly ruled, even coerced, by the virtuous. Renaissance republics 
like Florence and Siena may in practice have chosen office-holders by lot, but the 
Renaissance humanists generally disapproved of this practice precisely because it ignored 
the claims of virtue.17 They preferred election and other presumptively meritocratic forms 9
of selection, rather than allowing chance, fate or Divine Providence to choose a polity’s 
rulers. Renaissance humanists did not believe that human beings possessed an intrinsic 
dignity qua human that gave them a title to self-rule and political autonomy. Dignity – 
worthiness – was something earned, not ascribed. The more merit one displayed, the 
more one was entitled to liberty and self-government.  It will be noticed that this form of 
elitism is more commonly associated with positive liberty than with negative liberty – or 
with republican liberty as described by Pettit and Skinner.
  It is worth noting that this argument from the distribution of virtue was also 
extended to humanist discussions of international relations and the morality of empire. In 
Leonardo Bruni’s Panegyric of the City of Florence and in his History of the Florentine 
People he advances the argument that Florence can justify her empire in Tuscany because 
she surpassed all other Tuscan peoples in virtue. All city-states by nature desire freedom, 
but not all are worthy of it, and those unworthy were justly dominated by more virtuous 
states.18 This attitude, widely found in the fifteenth century, points up another of the 
difficulties facing modern civic republicans. Modern republican theorists take it as 
axiomatic that domination (or “alien control”) of one state by another is suboptimal,19 but 
many Renaissance humanists did not see a contradiction in desiring liberty for themselves 
and dominance over others. “Dominion and liberty, for mortal men nothing is more dear 
nor more welcome than these two things,” ran a famous fourteenth century adage.20 It 
was not until the time of Francesco Guicciardini and later Fabio Albergati that some 
republican theorists articulate a moral critique of free cities that imposed their rule on 
subject cities. 10
It is true that Bruni in the Panegyric and in his History tries to maintain that the 
Florentine subject cities were sometimes more free after submitting to Florence than they 
had been under their previous oligarchic and tyrannical governments. But his argument is 
based on the Florentines’ imposition of the rule of law. The subject cities in the Florentine 
territorial state lost much of their power of self-determination, particularly in foreign 
policy, and Bruni believed that this promoted harmony in old Etruria. His claim that the 
subject cities were protected from arbitrary actions of powerful individuals by the rule of 
law is limited, however, by his exempting one powerful individual in particular, namely 
the Republic of Florence. As the subject cities were inferior in wisdom and virtue, they 
were expected to take direction in foreign relations from Florence. Florentines should try 
to do their best to persuade their allies and subject towns of the wisdom of Florentine 
policy, but in the end those towns had no legal or political recourse preventing their being 
ordered, for example, to provide troops for Florentine wars. This is clearly an argument 
incompatible with a non-domination model of liberty.
  The argument from distribution of virtue is not, to be sure, the only argument 
deployed by Renaissance humanists in favor of republican liberty.  Nearly as important 
was what might be called the argument from history. This argument is indebted to 
Cicero’s De officiis and other ancient texts but was elaborated upon by a number of 
Renaissance republican writers, and has remained popular in the republican tradition to 
this day. It was first powerfully articulated by Leonardo Bruni in his Oration for the 
Funeral of Nanni Strozzi (1427), and later echoed by Bartolomeo Scala in his Defense 
against the Detractors of Florence (1496) and other writers. In the Strozzi oration Bruni 11
goes so far as to deny legitimacy to monarchies and aristocracies on the grounds that such 
forms of government have never in fact existed; they belong to a null set; all monarchies 
and aristocracies that claim to be such are actually masks for tyrannies and oligarchies. 
By process of elimination this leaves popular government as the one truly good 
government: Bruni is clearly thinking here of Aristotle’s constitutional typology of the 
three good and three bad constitutions.21
Of course this is an invalid argument, as there can be no guarantee that the 
constitution left over is virtuous, and Bruni does not bother to argue that it can be. He is 
writing a panegyric, not a treatise.22 The argument he advances is not theoretical but 
historical. Bruni is making what logicians would call a rash generalization, basing his 
conclusions about republican liberty on a single case, that of the Roman republic. Rome 
had her greatest moments of military power and cultural glory in the period between the 
expulsion of the Tarquins and the battle of Actium; the imperial period was one of moral 
corruption and imperial decline; hence the best form of government is that of a free 
people.23 Borrowing from Sallust, Bruni claimed that the reason for the success of the 
Roman republic was its characteristic freedom to participate in public life, which led to a 
virtuous circle of competition for glory and empire amongst rival great men. Monarchs, 
by contrast, are said to be suspicious of virtue in their subjects. So a virtuous republic is 
preferred because it leads to the success of the state vis à vis other states. This might 
remotely be called a kind of non-domination model of liberty, in that liberty here prevents 
the republic from being dominated by other states. But note that the historical argument 
does not claim to show that republican power-sharing protects all citizens within the state 12
from the power of overmighty oligarchs. In the Roman case, as Bruni well knew, liberty 
to participate in politics led to gross inequities of political power.  The dynamics of 
competition for glory in Rome positively encouraged and corrupted power-seeking 
individuals in the late republic, leading to the loss of liberty for most citizens. This was 
something Bruni chose to ignore; but humanists advocating monarchy were quick to 
emphasize it.24 Roman history thus became an arena for testing the proposition that 
republican liberty could enable a state to dominate rival states, a proposition that Bruni, 
like Machiavelli, accepted and indeed championed. Of course to dominate other states 
means not to be dominated oneself, but this is hardly a basis for foreign affairs with 
which modern republican would be comfortable.25
  In addition to the argument from the distribution of virtue and the argument from 
history, the humanists also articulated an argument for republican liberty based on its 
ability to provide what we would call negative liberty, or freedom from interference. The 
definition of liberty most commonly quoted by republican theorists prima facie sounds 
rather like a negative concept: it is Cicero’s definition in Paradoxa Stoicorum 34, that 
liberty is a power of living as you will. However, in its original context this definition 
does not align with the modern non-interference concept, since Cicero further explains 
that for the Stoics, “living” in the true sense of the word would be to live rationally in 
accordance with nature and human duty; the way to do this is to act with virtue, so we are 
returned to the self-mastery model of virtue and liberty. The definition does not allow 
room for the unconstrained pursuit of unspecified private ends; human ends are already 
given by Nature. Yet Renaissance republican thinkers often forgot or ignored this context, 13
possibly because they often quoted it indirectly from the jurist Baldus de Ubaldis, who 
added to the definition of liberty as a power of living as you wished the words “within the 
limits set by law and custom.”26 Baldus thus takes a Stoic paradox about the equivalence 
of liberty and rationality and makes it into something more like a modern non-
interference concept, a definition which establishes a zone of unconstrained behavior 
within boundaries set by law and decency.
Bartolomeo Scala quotes the definition in this form in his Defense of Florence 
Against Detractors of 1496. In this oration, written during his more populist, 
“Savonarolan” phase, Scala says the purpose of both monarchies and republics is to seek 
peace and security of living for their citizens and the “faculty of managing their own 
affairs in accordance with their personal will and with the private advantage of each.”27 
This is the obverse of Scala’s statement a few pages earlier where he says, 
I think that, whenever men have united, they did so not for someone else's sake 
but for their own, and when they serve the common interest, they do so to derive 
their personal advantage from the public one. It is wrong, however, to infer from 
this that private advantage is to be put before public good. For truly, if private 
good is better and more easily to be found when the public good is served, who 
can doubt that the latter must be preferred even for the sake of the former? But 
this is no time to discuss the nobility of ends (§15). 
This sounds at first glance like Skinner’s instrumental common good: one serves 
the common good so in order to preserve one’s liberty to pursue private ends. But note 
that liberty is not praised because it is an instrument to protect our private interest.  In his 14
panegyric to liberty a few pages later (§18), Scala praises liberty in traditional terms, as a 
“divine and most excellent gift” which all noble individuals must try to obtain, as “an 
honorable ornament (decus) and prerogative (praerogativa) of our nature.” 
The expression “prerogative” or prescriptive right, “of our nature” suggests that 
Scala may have believed, unlike other humanists, that all human beings (not just 
Florentines) are entitled to liberty, but he follows this statement by admitting:
But it is not enough, you will say, to want to be free, as most of us do; but to have 
learned how to become free and to make use of freedom: that is what is truly 
splendid and worthy of a free mind.
Scala then proceeds to make an argument that Florentines prefer republican government 
because it is an instrument to promote liberty and because they fear tyranny, both of the 
one and of the few. (Aristocracy is said to be the constitution that promotes virtue, but 
according to Scala it slips too easily into oligarchy). Both kingship and republican 
government seek “peace and security … and the ability of each [subject or citizen] to 
manage his own affairs according to his personal will and his ability to manage his own 
affairs.” Both forms of government, not just republican government, aim at allowing 
citizens to pursue their private affairs freely. Scala’s prefers republican government 
because it serves everyone’s private interest better than monarchical government does. 
But this is not because it fosters civic virtue, but because its institutions are less easily 
corrupted.  For example, republican deliberation is slower, less passionate, fairer and 
better informed than the deliberation of royal courts.28 It is more likely to lead to stability15
—that  key criterion of constitutional excellence according to Aristotle—because stability 
is more in the interest of republican citizens than of royal counselors. 
There is not a word here about not wanting to be dominated or to be subject to 
another’s prerogative, nothing about the extra-legal exercise of arbitrary power, nothing 
about the need to participate in government and exercise civic virtue as a means of 
protecting one’s private ends.29 Scala’s goal for states is that they provide stability and 
freedom from interference in the pursuit of private interest. If a monarchy, however 
absolute, can accomplish those ends, then it too will have achieved the purpose of 
government. Scala’s claim is simply that the institutions of a republic like Florence are 
better suited to secure the private freedom necessary to pursue one’s own interests. What 
is wrong with monarchy is not that the monarch might exercise power over the citizen in 
an arbitrary way, but that the institutions of monarchy such as royal councils and courts 
are less effective in promoting the citizen’s free pursuit of his or her private interests. The 
objection is instrumental rather than ethical. 
  We seem to get closer to a non-domination concept of liberty in Alamanno 
Rinuccini’s anti-Medicean dialogue of 1479, the Dialogus de libertate.30  This work 
advanced the same Ciceronian definition of liberty as that used by Scala, but unlike 
Scala, Rinuccini was aware of its context in Stoic thought. Rinuccini knew that the 
definition presupposes a concept of self-mastery, and that living as you will really means 
living the way you ought to live, having a reasoned plan of life, living rightly in 
accordance with reason and duty and obeying rather than fearing natural law. Difficulties 
arise, however, when one tries to participate in politics under a tyrant. When political life 16
is corrupt, one can only engage successfully in politics by being equally corrupt. The 
tyrant’s overwhelming power makes it impossible to speak truth freely before him. The 
man of integrity is either punished and excluded from power or he must retire to the 
country and cut off all ties with the active life of politics. (The latter is what Rinuccini 
himself had done, having refused to perform a corrupt act for the Medici, and the 
dialogue is meant to justify his political quietism to friends urging him to re-enter public 
service.) For the man of integrity in a corrupt state (as Rinuccini says, following the De 
officiis), liberty becomes an inner state, a kind of spiritual fortitude that enables one to 
resist the temptation to yield to corrupt influences and keep an unblemished soul. So 
Rinuccini’s case at first sight looks like a magnificent example of a free man refusing to 
be dominated by arbitrary power. 
In the end, however, his idea of freedom is not really akin to what modern 
republicans mean by a non-domination concept of liberty. Rinuccini has an affection for a 
(no doubt imaginary) buon tempo antico where Florentines could engage in politics 
without compromising their virtue. He approves the actions of the Pazzi conspirators who 
tried to kill the tyrant Lorenzo and restore that republic of the mythical past. But by 
liberty Rinuccini really means the power to live a morally good life, and this Stoic ideal 
is ultimately designed to be independent of the status rei publicae, i.e., its constitutional 
form. That, in a way, is the whole point. Improving the design of laws and institutions to 
minimize dependency and increase equality might be desirable, but this will not increase 
liberty in the true, inner sense of the word, for this liberty can only be achieved as the 17
result of philosophical and moral training. The active life of politics is at best a matter of 
duty. It is not a source of human perfection but rather a threat to it.
This brings us to the issue of the active and contemplative lives. Here we find a 
marked difference among modern historians and theorists. The older civic humanist strain 
of thought typified by the historians Hans Baron and J. G. A. Pocock saw Renaissance 
republicans as having promoted a particular vision of the good life. Through the active 
life of the citizen in politics and military affairs, through living a life of civic virtue, a 
man engaged in the active life could achieve the human good. This meant that 
citizenship, self-governance and civic virtue were all intrinsically valuable aspects of 
human flourishing. In other words, republican liberty in the Renaissance, on this view, 
was tantamount to positive liberty in Isaiah Berlin’s sense.31
Quentin Skinner rightly saw that this older view imposed an Aristotelian and 
Greek finality upon texts that could not bear that interpretation; civic participation and 
self-governance in the Renaissance did  not ordinarily subserve perfectionist goals.32 The 
reason for this, I would suggest, is simply that the goal of human life in the Renaissance 
was supposed to be the province of religion, and most humanists avoided direct 
challenges to orthodox Christianity. Human perfection by definition could not be 
achieved in this life through human power, though some humanists like Bruni, following 
a famous quotation from Cicero’s Dream of Scipio, suggested piously that great virtue in 
the active life would be rewarded by beatitude in the next.33 In any case, Skinner and 
other modern republicans understand the active life of political participation, civic virtue 
and self-governance to be instrumentally valuable for preserving political liberty, 18
construed as non-domination. Vigilant and virtuous citizenship, commitment to the active 
life, protected personal liberties against the invasions of arbitrary power.
  As we have seen, this conception of the active life as an instrumental good is one 
that works better for Machiavelli than for most other humanist theorists. This is the case 
in part because the humanists understood the active life in a rather broader sense than is 
found in Aristotle or even Cicero.  As was fitting in an age of commercial republics, 
Renaissance civic humanists often included commercial and private economic activity in 
the realm of the active life, as in Leon Battista Alberti’s dialogues on the family or 
Bruni’s commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Economics. On the other hand, the active 
life of the citizen and its virtues are also commonly praised by humanists in the service of 
princely regimes; it is quite mistaken to think that ideals of citizenship were the exclusive 
property of republican theorists. Advocates of monarchy like Bornio da Sala or Francesco 
Patrizi (in his pro-monarchical voice) and Ottaviano Fregoso in the Courtier even use the 
terms vivere civile or vivere libero to describe political life under virtuous princes. In this 
broader sense of the active life, clearly, it cannot be construed simply as an instrumental 
safeguard of republican liberty.
  Nevertheless, even when we are talking about republican writers, and even when 
the latter confine themselves to the active life of politics, it is doubtful whether modern 
republican theorists correctly state the typical humanist view of the active life and civic 
participation. The most popular quotation cited in humanist discussions of the active life 
comes from (pseudo) Plato’s ninth letter, where, writing to Architas, who was tempted to 
withdraw from politics, Plato says “that none of us is born for himself alone; a part of our 19
existence belongs to our country, a part to our parents, a part to our other friends, and a 
large part to circumstances that command our lives. When our country calls us to public 
service it would be unnatural to refuse.” As filtered through Cicero’s De officiis this 
quotation is typically used to urge young men to enter public service and avoid a retired 
life of study or private endeavor. However, the many Renaissance writers who quote this 
passage typically do not argue that the life of involvement in public affairs will lead to 
happiness and human flourishing on the Aristotelian model; in fact they usually present 
public life as a disagreeable burden. But neither do they induce people to enter public life 
as a necessary evil, in order to protect their private interests and those of their kin and 
clients. Instead, the active life is presented, in the manner of the Stoics, as a duty that 
must be fulfilled. Human beings are not isolated persons but intrinsically social; they are 
born into families and clientage networks and cities and into a religion; each of these 
relationships implies duties, obligatory actions, which are discoverable by reason. These 
duties may be well done or badly, and the man who loves goodness and the God of 
Nature will do them well. He will earn the gratitude of those around him and win glory 
among posterity. These are real inducements. However, fulfilling one’s duties does not 
bring him beatitude in the next life; Christian theology taught that only God can give that. 
While Christian theology precluded a perfectionist value being attributed to the active 
life, it was probably rhetoric that prevented any use of the instrumentalist argument. 
Idealistic young men, then or now, are not ordinarily inspired to enter public service by 
being told it is a useful hedge against powerful enemies. That is a message to be 
whispered in the study, not shouted in the forum, and Renaissance humanists were 20
usually, in their imaginations at least, speaking in the presence of the populus Romanus 
Quirites.
  In short: Among Italian Renaissance humanists who wrote on politics there was 
no “republican tradition” characterized by a consistent commitment to liberty, construed 
as non-domination, and aiming at the pursuit of private ends. The humanists were too 
deeply influenced by Greek philosophy for that. Non-domination arguments can be 
extracted from Machiavelli and perhaps other sources, but this is an insignificant strand 
in the tradition of humanist political thought as a whole.  
The question remains, however, whether in the end this should matter for modern 
republicans. The answer to this question surely depends on what, exactly, a modern 
theorist believes the history of political thought is for. There is, to be sure, an imaginative 
appeal in the idea of a premodern republican tradition to which we can return. Especially 
if one starts from the idea that modern progressive politics has come to a theoretical 
impasse, there is appeal to the idea that we can retrace our steps, identify a wrong 
turning, and start over – it is the kind of appeal that is behind books such as Pocock’s 
Machiavellian Moment, Alasdair Macintyre’s After Virtue, or even Foucault’s Les mots et 
les choses, which aims to show the contingency of entrenched modern ideas about social 
science in general.34 There is appeal too in the idea that the past has something to offer 
the present, that it is not just a strange, unhappy country populated by moral monsters 
with whom we cannot possibly identify and who cannot be made to agree with us – the 
past of some progressive thinkers in our time. There is a longing to believe that our own 
age does not have all the answers and that previous ages did not get everything wrong.21
  Apart from this imaginative aspect, however, it should not matter very much to 
modern republicans that most Renaissance writers on politics do not have a non-
domination concept of liberty. After all, we are only talking about, at most, 200 years of a 
tradition of thought going back to the Romans, and I for one am not prepared to say that a 
non-domination concept is not applicable to Cicero or Sallust or Tacitus, still less for the 
seventeenth century writers discussed authoritatively by Quentin Skinner in his classic 
Liberty before Liberalism. The non-domination concept, or something very like it, does 
seem to be found in Machiavelli, and that is not trivial. But for those interested in finding 
a non-domination concept of liberty in the Italian Renaissance, it would be best to turn 
away from the formal writings of humanists and look at the grubby practice of 
Renaissance republican politics. There one can find many republican statesmen 
struggling to keep their liberties and those of their clients in the face of powerful 
combinations of wealth and prestige, a situation not unlike the one that concerns modern 
neo-republicans. Politically active citizens of Renaissance republics, like their forebears 
in the medieval popular commune, devoted much effort to finding legal and institutional 
means to limit the influence of the powerful, or at least to prevent the dominance of any 
one party or individual.35 
This was not, however, a major interest of the Renaissance humanists who wrote 
on politics and who dominated intellectually the period from Petrarch to Machiavelli and 
beyond.  Their outlook was that of educators, not theorists, and their focus, in politics as 
in ethics, was on virtue. Virtuous rulers made any number of laws and institutions 
unnecessary; and laws and institutions, no matter how good in themselves, were useless 22
without virtue. Their approach to the reform of politics was quite different from that 
advocated by modern republicans. For them, education in virtue was the key to a 
successful polity; it was worth more than any number of laws, regulations and policies; it 
transcended the whole question of constitutions and even of political liberty.  The 
humanists saw liberty as the reward of virtue, not its precondition; it was something to be 
merited, not a prescriptive right. All this seems foreign to our modern sensibilities. But 
that is not to say that the humanists’ political thought is irrelevant to the modern world.231 I am grateful to my colleague Mark Kishlansky for reading this essay and helping 
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